The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 confers limited but significant rights on people with disabilities in the United Kingdom. In this article we focus on the protection that the Act offers to people with epilepsy in the sphere of employment. We examine the exempt categories of employment and the extent to which epilepsy qualifies as a disability for statutory purposes. We go on to explore the impact of the new law on the recruitment and employment experience of people with epilepsy. The shortcomings of the legislation are highlighted and improvements, which would benefit people with epilepsy, are recommended. Claims featuring epilepsy, brought under the Act, are analysed to illustrate how the legislation is being interpreted and applied.
INTRODUCTION
The employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (hereafter referred to as the DDA) came into force on 2 December 1996. This article examines the rights that they confer on people with epilepsy and the residual scope for enhancing those rights. Particular attention will be paid to the criteria which govern access to the protection offered by the DDA, the duties it imposes on employers and to enforcement methods. By exploring the impact of the DDA on the recruitment process and employment, we show that legislation has only partly succeeded in dispelling the problems faced by people with epilepsy in relation to work.
DDA cases, particularly those involving applicants with epilepsy, will be referred to throughout the text. We should explain that claims alleging disability discrimination are first heard by Employment Tribunals (formerly known as Industrial Tribunals) and that appeals lie to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and thence to the Court of Appeal. It should be noted at the outset that only Court of Appeal and Employment Appeal Tribunal judgements set binding precedents, thus providing authoritative interpretations of the new law. The decisions of Employment Tribunals do not have to be followed by other Tribunals. * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
ACCESS TO STATUTORY PROTECTION
Only people able to prove that they have 1 , or have had 2 , a disability, are eligible for DDA protection. There is no cover for people wrongly perceived or diagnosed as having a disability, even if the perception or misdiagnosis attracts discrimination. The (Conservative) Government, which introduced the DDA, considered that the law 'would not be credible if it embraced people who were not fairly or generally recognized as disabled' 3 . This restrictive approach is, however, unhelpful in the context of epilepsy with its unusually high incidence of misdiagnosis 4 . Patients wrongly diagnosed as having epilepsy, who suffer unfair treatment as a result, have no redress under the DDA. It is worth noting that their counterparts in the United States fare better under the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 which protects against discrimination resulting from misclassification 5 .
How, then, is disability defined in the DDA? According to Section 1(1), people have a disability if they have a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. People who have had a disability in the past are protected by virtue of Section 2.
Although it is uncertain whether Members of Parliament regarded epilepsy as a 'mental' or 'physical' impairment, there is no real doubt that the condition is covered 6 . Meeting the impact requirements of the DDA definition of disability may, however, be more problematic for people with epilepsy. Where epilepsy has little or no impact on day-to-day activities because it is successfully controlled by medication, it falls within the ambit of the DDA because of the special provisions in relation to medical treatment of disabilities contained in Schedule 1, Paragraph 6 7 . However, people not on medication, who experience only simple partial seizures, or sleep seizures, will have difficulty showing the 'substantial and long-term adverse effect' on their ability to carry out day-to-day activities which the DDA insists upon. There may also be people, again not on medication, whose epilepsy did once have a substantial adverse effect, but fails the 'long-term' test because the impact was shorter than the 12 months fixed as the minimum by the DDA, and is unlikely to recur 8 .
As the first major study of the DDA's operation shows 9 , some employers do challenge claimants on each component of the definition of disability. Although applicants with mild forms of epilepsy may well lose their case on this preliminary issue, we should point out that out of the monitored 'heard' (as opposed to settled or withdrawn) cases involving epilepsy which we could trace, none failed on the definition of disability 10 . This may, unfortunately, merely reflect the fact that would-be claimants dared not pursue their claims because their epilepsy did not meet the requirements of the DDA definition.
In order to protect everyone diagnosed as having epilepsy from discrimination, the DDA should omit the definitional requirement of long-term, substantial impact and cover any disability, however short-lived or slight. Why should mildly disabled people be left to fend for themselves when they fall victim to prejudice? They may be less at risk of meeting discrimination, but when they do meet it, they need redress as much as severely disabled people do. This is particularly so with epilepsy:
. . . very few people have experience of it and so the word gets around: 'Of course you know, he's got epilepsy'. Most people do not have a clue what the condition is, how it exhibits itself, its frequency, or what effect it has on a person's life-it just sounds horrible 11 .
Widening the definition of disability to encompass conditions with minor and/or short-lived effects would suit job applicants and employees with epilepsy without unduly burdening employers, as the latter should have few problems accommodating mild disability in the workplace. It must, however, be acknowledged that even a wide definition of disability will still permit employers to argue that a particular person falls outside its ambit. It follows that DDA claimants with epilepsy should be prepared to present medical evidence showing that their condition meets the statutory requirements.
Research shows that both applicants and respondents are worried by the cost of medical evidence. They are also concerned that the usual sources of medical evidence, particularly GPs and occupational health professionals, are unequal to the task of relating their expertise to DDA requirements, because of lack of familiarity with the DDA approach, definitions and terminology 12 . Objective appraisals of the medical risks to self and others associated with a particular individual doing a particular job are hard to come by 13 . In Holmes v. Whittingham & Porter Ltd 14 , the medical report used as the basis for a risk assessment of the applicant who had epilepsy was prepared by the applicant's GP and the employer's medical adviser, also a GP. It advised against continuing to let Mr Holmes work in his customary environment and capacity, and, as a result, Mr Holmes lost his job. The Tribunal which dealt with the case took the view that the employers should have consulted a specialist in occupational medicine or epilepsy before sacking their employee, in order to investigate the potential benefits of changing the latter's medication, and/or adjusting his working conditions. Even where experts become involved, however, problems of risk assessment may persist: in Smith v. Carpets International UK plc 15 , another case involving epilepsy, a report by the applicant's neurologist, to the effect that the applicant could safely resume work, was successfully challenged by the employer's doctor on the basis that the neurologist had no insight into the hazards of Mr Smith's work environment. The case of Bragg v. London Underground Ltd 16 (involving genetic hearing loss) indicates that where health experts disagree among themselves, the employer is entitled to make a choice provided that the chosen expert opinion is not obviously flawed.
Even where people with epilepsy can prove themselves to be within the DDA definition of disability, access to protection against disability discrimination will be denied if the employer suspected of such discrimination falls within one of the statutory exemptions. The employment provisions of the DDA do not apply to businesses with fewer than 15 employees, nor to fire services, the armed forces, the police and other specified employers 17 .
The small business exemption significantly restricts the availability of protection under the DDA. Its impact is potentially most serious for people with impaired mobility or who are forbidden to drive, as many people with epilepsy are. This is because small businesses are often more accessible than larger ones, being within, or close to, residential areas, and often eas-ier to reach by public transport. Further, in many rural areas, small businesses are the norm, and people with epilepsy are therefore effectively deprived from any protection in such locations.
Why was the exemption considered necessary? It reflects Government concerns that small firms lack the financial resources and personnel expertise to implement the protection conferred by the DDA on people with disabilities. However, built into the DDA, is a mechanism for ensuring that no undue burdens are placed on employers. As we shall discuss more fully later, the latter have a complete defence against claims of discrimination if they had a substantial reason, material to the individual case, for what they did, and took account of the duty to make reasonable adjustments where appropriate. Whether reasonable adjustments have been made must be judged in the light of, among other factors, the employer's resources. So even without a small business exemption, less effort need be made by poorly resourced businesses than by well-resourced ones. This renders the exemption superfluous and it should be removed from the DDA.
The occupation-based exemptions are predicated on concerns about the capacity of people with disabilities to work in stressful and often hazardous posts or work environments, but they too are superfluous. The DDA already allows employers to reject employees or job applicants if they cannot substantially match job requirements. There is no need for an additional presumption that certain jobs will always prove too demanding for people with disabilities. At the time of writing, the Home Office seems prepared to concede this point in relation to the police, prison and fire services, whereas the Ministry of Defence remains reluctant to surrender the armed forces exemption 18 .
RECRUITMENT
Under the DDA, discrimination can take two forms. One involves an employer treating people less favourably than others for a reason related to their disability, without being able to show that such treatment is justified (Section 5(1)). The other entails an employer failing to comply with his or her statutory duty of making reasonable adjustments to accommodate, without being able to justify such a failure (Section 5(2)). It is unlawful for employers to discriminate in either of these ways when recruiting or promoting employees (Section 4).
In relation to advertisements and job specifications, employers discriminate if they proscribe disabilities which would not (after reasonable adjustments) affect work performance, or if they insist on unnecessary skills, achievements or qualities. A blanket exclusion of people with epilepsy is thus discriminatory 19 . An employer who asks for a driving licence, discriminates against those people with epilepsy who by law cannot hold a licence unless the employer can show that travelling is a genuine job requirement which cannot reasonably be performed except by the job applicant driving him or herself. An employer who asks for willingness to do shiftwork similarly discriminates against people whose epilepsy makes shiftwork undesirable, if there is either no real need for shiftwork, or such a need exists but could be met by other employees within their terms of employment. Assessing an employer's genuine needs remains a problem: the DDA does not compel employers to specify essential job functions, and this means that job applicants continue to have difficulties gauging their own suitability for a particular post, as well as the validity of any functional or health requirements listed by the employer.
The DDA does not prevent employers enquiring whether someone has a disability. However, the Code of Practice 20 which accompanies the legislation, recommends that an employer should only ask about a disability if it might interfere with the performance of necessary job functions 21 . It follows, in our opinion, that employers, wishing to stay within the law, should avoid general questions about epilepsy but could legitimately enquire about symptoms likely to affect functional ability in a particular post 22 .
From the perspective of the job applicant with epilepsy, any pre-employment questions about epilepsy remain threatening. Truthful answers could cause the prejudiced employer to reject the applicant. The applicant could claim discrimination, but the employer might succeed in showing some plausible reason other than prejudice, for the rejection. In any case, not all applicants who suspect disability discrimination, are willing to put the matter to the test when it takes confidence, money and skill to do so. They also fear the possibility, that not their disability but some CV deficiency or a poor reference lost them the job, or that others made stronger candidates. Tribunals do not infer discrimination merely from a failure to short-list a disabled applicant 23 . Furthermore, legal representatives and advisers are reluctant to pursue recruitment claims unless they involve particularly blatant discrimination 24 . It is perhaps not surprising that among DDA claims, recruitment cases are least likely to be successful 25 .
Not disclosing a disability such as epilepsy at all is not, however, to be recommended to job applicants. In the case of O'Neill v. Symm & Co 26 , the Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that as the employers had no knowledge of their employee's disability, the employee's claim that they had treated her less favourably as a result of her disability was bound to fail. Knowledge of merely the 'material features' of a disability may suffice 27 to implicate an employer, but what would count as the material features of the diverse seizure disorders labelled epilepsy? In Ridout v. TC Group 28 the job applicant had declared that she suffered from (medication-controlled) epilepsy. She attended a job interview in a room lit by fluorescent lighting but did not inform the employers that such lighting could adversely affect her as a consequence of her epilepsy. As a result, she lost her claim that the employers had discriminated against her by failing to make reasonable adjustments. The Tribunal indicated that she should have been more forthcoming at her interview by suggesting that the room was unsuitable for her.
The DDA is designed to change the attitudes of employers vis-à-vis potential or actual employees with disabilities and to encourage a balance of communication and understanding between the two sides. It is not designed to persecute employers who remain unaware of a disability. Although it is true that rejecting claims, where the employers do not know of the disability, may encourage employers to refrain from asking about disabilities at all, it may conversely prompt employees and job applicants to explain their particular needs, thus forcing employers to consider the reasonable adjustments which should be made to avoid liability and expensive claims.
Good practice in relation to recruitment requires attention to the concerns of both employers and job applicants. Employers must be prepared to identify job components, the health and functional requirements of jobs and medical conditions deemed to be bars to jobs. No. questions about health or disability should be included in job application forms. Job applicants could however be asked to complete health declaration forms, but these should be kept entirely separate from the job application form and should not be demanded or submitted until applicants receive notification, that they have been short-listed for interview, or of a conditional job offer. Health declarations should be inspected only by those qualified to interpret them correctly. Medical examinations of job applicants should be prohibited in all cases until a conditional job offer has been made.
Principles of good practice similar to those just outlined have been advocated for several years in relation to the recruitment of people with epilepsy 29 . They should become part of the DDA regime by incorporating them into the Code of Practice. Failure to observe a 'good practice' tenet should raise an irrebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination under the DDA. The expansion of, and increased access to occupational health services would need to be prioritized by the Government to make the changes workable.
Less favourable treatment
As we explained in the preceding section on recruitment, treating disabled people less favourably than others is a key indicator of unlawful discrimination. However, how should 'less favourable treatment' be understood? In the 1998 case of Clark v. Novacold 30 the Employment Appeal Tribunal delivered a judgement to the effect that when deciding the issue of less favourable treatment under Section 5(1) of the DDA, it was necessary to compare the claimant with an ablebodied employee in the same position. Mr Clark had been absent from work on a long-term basis on account of his disability, and was compared with an ablebodied employee who had been or would have been absent for as long a time. His employers convinced the Tribunal that both disabled and able-bodied employees would have been dismissed on account of their absenteeism, and that Mr Clark was therefore not treated less favourably than others.
In the subsequent case of British Sugar v. Kirker 31 , the Employment Appeal Tribunal appeared to reject its own reasoning in Clark. The DDA was said not to require a like-for-like comparison, and therefore no comparator was nominated. Clark went to the Court of Appeal 32 which, confirming Kirker, ruled that treatment was less favourable if the reason for it did not or would not apply to others.
The reason for Mr Clark's treatment (the ultimate dismissal) was held to be his absence from work. His absence was a reason which related to his disability. The DDA required the treatment given to him (dismissal) to be compared with the treatment which would have been given to someone to whom that reason, absence from work, did not apply. In other words the question was whether or not someone who had not been absent from work would have been dismissed. The answer was clearly no.
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal reflected the intentions of Parliament which, during the Second Reading of the Bill introducing the DDA, had been told by the Minister for Social Security and Disabled People:
The Bill is drafted in such a way that indirect as well as direct discrimination can be dealt with. . . . A situation where dogs are not admitted to a café, with the effect that blind people would be unable to enter it, would be a prima facie case of indirect discrimination against blind people and would be unlawful 33 .
According to the original decision in Clark, the blind people in the above example would not have been treated less favourably than others, as all dogs were banned from the café, thus there would have been no discrimination and the DDA would be redundant. To render the DDA effective, the comparators must be 'others' without dogs. The reason, (being accompanied by a dog) for being refused access to refreshments in the café, would not apply to 'others' without dogs, yet clearly the presence of a guide dog relates to the blind person's disability.
The preferable approach for Tribunals to now take in light of the Court of Appeal's decision is to ask:
(1) Was the applicant dismissed for a reason relating to his or her disability?
(2) If yes, did the respondents treat him or her less favourably than they would treat others to whom that reason did not apply?
Therefore it would seem that it is relatively easy for an applicant to prove the issue of less favourable treatment. However, in addition to this, there is a further and more difficult obstacle to overcome. Section 5(1)(b) states that such treatment is only discriminatory if the employer cannot show that it is justified. If the employer justifies his or her actions then clearly the applicant will lose his or her case. This issue will be discussed in more detail once we have considered discrimination through a failure to make reasonable adjustments.
Reasonable adjustments
Section 5(2) of the DDA states that employers further discriminate against a disabled person if they fail to make reasonable adjustments to the arrangements and the physical features of the workplace, thus leaving disabled people at a substantial disadvantage compared with others. An inexhaustive list of which adjustments can reasonably be made is set out in Section 6(3), although Section 6(4) insists that the financial and practical implications for the employer of implementing such reasonable adjustments ought to be considered, thereby creating a balance between the interests of the employees and employers. Statistics on the various causes of action brought before the Employment Tribunals since the DDA was introduced, show that a failure to make reasonable adjustments was the second most common reason for commencing a case. Twenty-five percent of cases were brought because of an alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments 34 .
However, it is submitted that this figure will eventually fall for two reasons. Firstly because the Court of Appeal in Clark highlighted the necessity for employers of carrying out any reasonable adjustments before they could validly argue justification, there may now be an increase in the number of employers prepared to make reasonable adjustments, before they incur the costs of litigation. Already in Holmes v. Whittingham & Porter Ltd 35 , referred to earlier in connection with the issue of medical evidence, an Employment Tribunal had stated that one of the reasons why the applicant would win his case was that his employers had failed to consider the adjustments that could have been made in his working conditions before they dismissed him on account of his epilepsy. Now the Court of Appeal has reinforced this approach.
Secondly there is some evidence that firms are generally becoming more aware of the requirement to make reasonable adjustments, and prepared to comply. When we informally asked a selection of firms about their policy on employing people with epilepsy, 42% implicitly or explicitly indicated that they were prepared to make reasonable adjustments.
Very few of the employers asked had looked at the pre-employment stage with a view to making reasonable adjustments. Only 8% specifically confirmed that they would make reasonable adjustments at the interview stage, leading to the possibility that applicants with epilepsy might find themselves at a disadvantage at an early stage in the recruitment process. However, it must be acknowledged that this state of affairs threatens applicants with epilepsy less than applicants with other disabilities, for there is often no need for adjustments at the interview stage for an applicant with epilepsy. That is not to say that there can never be a requirement for such adjustments, as highlighted in the case of Ridout v. TC Group 36 which we discussed in connection with recruitment.
It is imperative, in our opinion, that in appropriate cases, the employer and the applicant should communicate immediately after the applicant has been short-listed for interview, with both parties requesting and offering information, thereby averting the potential danger of the employer lacking knowledge of the epilepsy, and consequently failing to make any reasonable adjustments at the interview stage.
A further advantage of making enquiries at an early stage is that employers may be put at ease with regard to the reasonable adjustments which must be undertaken, in order to accommodate the individual during the course of his or her potential employment, thus displacing any misconceptions they may have previously held. Both parties will know what is expected of them and there will not be any surprises mid-employment.
Our enquiries highlighted that very few employers consulted the individual applicants themselves about the reasonable adjustments which could be made either before or during their employment. Only 13% consulted applicants during the recruitment process, yet consultation with applicants is essential for they are likely to have the best understanding of their epilepsy. For example, questions could be asked with a view to assessing the applicants' understanding and management of their epilepsy, their compliance with any medication, the degree of control over their epilepsy and any problems they themselves foresee vis-à-vis their potential employment, although the employer would be wary of the fact that applicants may hide the true extent of their epilepsy either through fear of not securing employment or through embarrassment 37 .
Consultation would also have the advantage of discouraging employers from viewing applicants with epilepsy en bloc. Each case, and in particular the individual's ability to perform his or her duties, should be judged on its own merits, something which is at present done by only 16% of our employer respondents. When it comes to assessing the potential effects of a disability on a person's functional capacity, it is wholly insufficient to attach labels to the different forms of a particular disability. This is particularly true of epilepsy, where some of the employers we questioned were still using what is now considered to be out-of-date terminology such as 'petit mal' and 'grand mal', with one employer going so far as to state that they were unaware that there were different forms of epilepsy. The effects of a disability must be considered as opposed to the actual disability itself as every disability varies according to its severity, its effects and its treatment. To fully understand the implications of a particular person's epilepsy for a particular work environment or job, occupational health expertise may be needed. Occupational health advice should be widely available to job applicants, employees and employers and the Government must play its part in improving access.
Justification
Both Sections 5(1)(b) and 5(2)(b) of the DDA specifically require employers to prove that their less favourable treatment of their employee, or their failure to make reasonable adjustments is justified.
When delivering the leading Court of Appeal judgement in Clark 38 Mummery LJ stated:
As things have turned out, the critical question in this case is that of justification of the treatment. This will also probably be the case with many other complaints under the 1995 Act.
When deciding the issue of justification, the Employment Tribunal will consider a number of points individual to each particular case. Justification has to be material to the circumstances of the case and it must be substantial, meaning 'not minor' and having substance, that is to say, capable of being objectively justified 39 . 40 will serve as an illustration. In that case an employee was dismissed by reason of his occasional epileptic seizures in the workplace, which were said to alarm his colleagues. The factors which the Employment Tribunal held to be of importance were that the employers had not followed the Code of Practice by, firstly having discussions with the employee himself about what the real effects of the disability might be or what might help, and secondly by making use of available expertise about the problem, particularly from the kind of freely available documentation produced by the employee. Had staff been given sufficient information about their colleague's epilepsy, they would have felt more at ease. The failure of the employers to educate themselves and their staff about epilepsy fatally undermined their justification defence.
The case of Jordan v. J. H. Haskins & Sons Ltd
The large number of cases which have been remitted to the Employment Tribunals from the Employment Appeal Tribunals on the issue of justification, suggests that the Employment Tribunals are failing to properly consider justification in sufficient detail to the disadvantage of both employees and employers.
Remedies
Section 8 of the DDA outlines the three remedies available to a successful applicant, and each will be analysed in turn.
Under Section 8(2)(a), a Tribunal can make a declaration, which is usually available where either the applicant has not suffered any measurable loss, or a point of principle is involved. A Tribunal may use its declaratory powers to encourage an employer to take positive steps, for example by offering the applicant employment or reinstatement, but the legal effects of such declarations are doubtful 41 : unlike recommendations, they cannot be enforced.
Tribunals may make a recommendation under Section 8(2)(c). These generally urge the employer to take reasonable steps to address shortcomings, within a specified period of time. It however remains a moot point whether a Tribunal can recommend that an applicant be appointed to the post he or she applied for 42 . Furthermore, in one decision the Employment Tribunal felt itself powerless to order that a reference be written for the applicant by his former employers, and relied on the hope that the employers would 'cooperate and adopt the spirit of [the] decision' 43 .
In view of the emphasis on encouraging employers to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabled employees, it is thought that there will be a shift from the remedy of awarding compensation to that of making a recommendation.
Under Section 8(5), if an employer fails to comply with a recommendation, then a Tribunal may either increase the amount of compensation to be awarded to the applicant where a compensation order had already been made, or make an order for compensation under Section 8(2)(b).
By virtue of Section 8(3), an applicant can make a claim for compensation under any or all of the following three heads of damages.
(a) Actual losses. This covers the period up to the date of the Tribunal judgement, provided that the loss is attributable to the discriminatory act.
(b) Future losses. This will include the future loss of earnings and any fringe benefits the applicant would have been entitled to. However, the duration of the future period may be limited by the Tribunal.
(c) Injury to feelings. Section 8 (4) where the applicant who suffered from depression was awarded £15 000 for the injury to his feelings, as a consequence of the treatment he received from his employers which led to a deterioration of his condition.
A recent survey for the Equal Opportunities Review has shown that compensatory awards by Employment Tribunals to disability discrimination victims, have soared by 300%. Last year the average award stood at £11 500, three times that in 1997 48 .
A disability rights commission
The remedies discussed in the last section are at present available only to individuals. No. statutory enforcement agency, equivalent to those set up under the Race Relations and Sex Discrimination legislation of the 1970s was established under the DDA. As a result, there is no mechanism for investigating and tackling discrimination within a business or an entire sphere of employment. Nor can aggrieved individuals obtain advice and legal representation from a central source of DDA expertise. Legislation creating a Disability Rights Commission to address such issues, is now however before Parliament 49 . The Commission will be empowered to conduct formal investigations which may culminate in non-discrimination notices, demanding compliance with DDA duties. It will also be able to offer legal advice and representation to potential claimants. In deciding whether to help an individual, the Commission will be expected to consider whether the case raises a question of principle, but also whether 'it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to deal with the case unaided' 50 .
We are unable to predict how the Commission will exercise its discretion and the proportion of claims likely to gain its support. That support is vital in securing DDA rights for individuals can no longer be doubted 51 .
CONCLUSION
Understanding of the DDA by the Employment Tribunals and Courts is steadily increasing, and recent decisions reflect the spirit and intention of the legislation. This is particularly so with regard to proving less favourable treatment, now that the Court of Appeal has made a binding judgement implementing the overall purpose of the DDA. Although proving a failure to make reasonable adjustments remains more difficult, a new appreciation of an employer's duty to make such adjustments, is, we have argued, likely to emerge.
A number of problems continue to beset the litigation process in our view. One is the failure on the part of Tribunals to properly consider the issue of justification at the initial hearing of the case. When the case reaches the Employment Appeal Tribunal, it must then be remitted on that point to the Employment Tribunal, costing money and time, and prolonging what is already a stressful experience for the parties. However, the Court of Appeal judgement in Clark, referred to earlier, which highlighted the importance of the justification defence, may be effecting a positive change.
We also find that the declaratory remedy warrants further consideration. We question whether Tribunals should have the option of awarding a remedy which the applicant cannot enforce. Declarations should be withdrawn, leaving only the two enforceable remedies of recommendations and compensation in place.
In view of compensation, we note with concern the absence of set criteria for calculating awards, which has produced wide discrepancies. Why should one applicant be awarded £500 for injury caused to feelings when another receives £15 000? Furthermore, when computing loss of future earnings, some Tribunals seem groundlessly confident that the applicant will have no difficulty in finding a new job within the year, and arbitrarily limit his or her losses accordingly.
Even the soundest adjudications by Tribunals would not improve access to the protection which the DDA offers to people with epilepsy. The crucial statutory definition of disability must be revised so that it covers all forms of epilepsy. The statutory exemptions should be repealed, leaving employers, employees and job applicants to focus solely on job requirements and the capacity to meet them.
We do consider that as regards recruitment, the DDA has tackled the cruder forms of discrimination against people with epilepsy effectively. Absolute bars on employment and obviously unjustifiable requirements are now clearly unlawful. However, subtler forms of discrimination are, practically speaking, still available: employers are not required to specify job functions, yet are allowed to ask about a job applicant's seizures or the effects of medication, and so have scope for prejudiced reactions. The DDA still needs to take on board the good practice principles which deprive employers of opportunities to discriminate.
Once the Disability Rights Commission is in place, challenging discrimination may become easier. However, it remains the case that an accessible occupational health service should underpin the DDA provisions, so that all involved may have reliable information on the implications of an individual's disability for his or her chosen work and vice versa.
Undermining the DDA's effectiveness is the lack of easy access to tribunal decisions. Cases are reported only sporadically and media attention has been limited. Developing an insight into how Tribunals are applying the DDA is difficult for lawyers, let alone potential litigants. It may be recalled that in the case of Ridout v. TC Group, the Employment Tribunal considered that Mrs Ridout should have warned the employers that the lights at the interview venue would affect her epilepsy, yet without knowledge of that decision other job applicants will also remain silent in unsuitable interview venues. Similarly, the criticism of the employers in Jordan v. Haskins for failing to provide their staff with information about a colleague's epilepsy will go unheeded by other firms, in similar situations, which have not heard of the case. If employers are to improve their attitudes and practices, and employees and job applicants are to mount confident antidiscrimination challenges, more will have to be done to disseminate information about legal developments.
The DDA currently benefits many people with epilepsy, but wider access to its protection, and an extension of the employment rights it confers, are urgently needed. If such improvements were accompanied by better information, help with claims and occupational health initiatives, the law would make a genuine difference.
